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Care of Death: 
On the Teaching of Reiner Schürmann
C. LONG
Abstract: A homage in the guise of an essay, this is the story of the last course Reiner 
Schürmann taught. As a text, it attempts to describe, situate, and come to terms with 
the power of Schürmann’s teaching in the context of his last lectures on Heidegger’s 
Being and Time. But if it is to be true to the deepest lessons of Schürmann’s thinking, 
it will also need to be heard as an invitation to interpret together the significance of 
his reading so that it may be permitted to shape the course of the lives of those who 
encounter it.
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In the Phaedo, Socrates makes Simmias laugh when he suggests that “those who happen to have gotten in touch with philosophy in the right way devote (epitēdeuō) themselves to nothing else but dying and being 
dead.”1 Simmias himself admits that he is not much for laughing; yet he found 
himself somehow there laughing as he attended to Socrates in his prison cell on 
the prescribed day of his death.
Of course, that’s how it was with Socrates, always putting those he encoun-
tered in touch with something they had not expected of themselves or of the 
world they inhabited.
Reassuring his friend, Socrates goes on to suggest that it would be laughable 
if someone who had lived a life devoted to death would, when death itself was 
at hand, be aggrieved. “In fact, Simmias,” Socrates goes on to say, “those who 
philosophize rightly make dying their care (melataō).”2
Socrates is here playing with words in a poignant and provocative way: the 
verb melataō means both take thought or care of something, but also, to pursue 
or practice. Indeed, as it resonates with the practice of devotion (epitēdeuō) that 
had provoked laughter in Simmias at the beginning, the idea that philosophy, when 
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rightly pursued, is the careful practice of dying begins to seem less ridiculous 
and more descriptive of the devoted practices of Socrates’ life and of the way he 
intended to practice his death in those final hours. It is a fitting start to a dialogue 
that performs beautifully the argument for which it advocates.3
We don’t generally attend carefully enough to the manner in which those 
who practice philosophy put their philosophical commitments into practice. 
Yet, in some deep sense, Plato puts these words into the mouth of Socrates in the 
Phaedo precisely to show the performative consistency between Socrates’ life and 
his thinking, his deeds and his words. Plato, for his part, seems to have dedicated 
his life to putting words to the practices of Socratic philosophy in dialogues that 
might motivate others to consider undertaking the careful practices of philoso-
phy. The dialogues, inspired by Socrates, were written in ways that inspire those 
who encounter them to pursue philosophy as a living practice. In this sense, the 
dialogues are eloquent testimony to the transformative power of teaching.
Teaching here, however, is decidedly not a question of indoctrination. To the 
contrary, indoctrination is the opposite of genuine pedagogical practice. When 
Socrates makes Simmias laugh, he leads him to a moment of self-reflection that 
invites him to be present to the moment in a way he might not otherwise have 
been. Great teaching attunes us to what discloses itself, to the unfolding of life 
and thus also to the death that constitutes life as its limit. We encounter Socrates 
teaching until the very end, and caring for those he taught in the very manner 
in which he died.
In the spring of 1993, Reiner Schürmann taught Philosophy 261: Heidegger’s 
Being and Time as a huge lecture course. He knew it would be his last. He had 
asked me to be one among a number of graduate teaching assistants for that 
course, which packed the auditorium on the first floor of the Graduate Faculty 
building on 5th Ave between 13th and 14th streets in New York City. To be a teach-
ing assistant for him that semester, for that course, was a daunting task—we all 
knew that our teacher was dying of AIDS and that this would likely be the last 
opportunity we would have to learn from him in the classroom. What we learned 
that semester, however, extends far beyond anything that was said during those 
compelling lectures; for what unfolded in the reading Schürmann offered and in 
his graceful ways of inviting us to enter into dialogue with the text even as his 
finitude pressed itself upon him, continues to fold itself into the lives of each one 
of us who encountered Schürmann as a teacher.
It was standing room only on February 3, 1993, if my notes from the class 
are reliable. We had come to hear Schürmann engage in a deep reading of a book 
that meant so much to so many of us in part at least because it meant so much 
to him. When Schürmann taught, he lectured in the original sense of the term: 
he offered a reading (legere) and invited us to read along with him. His readings, 
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whether of Heidegger or Nietzsche, Kant or Luther, Eckhart or Plotinus, Plato or 
Parmenides, were always provocative and compelling.
“Our starting point,” writes Schürmann in an early essay entitled “Symbolic 
Difference,” “shall be the privileged experience of understanding we have in read-
ing a text. What befalls someone who is compelled to enter into this hermeneutical 
relation, reading a document written in a language whose signifiers are under-
standable to them through their culture?”4
The answer, he provides moments later: “to read is to interpret, to interpret 
is to exist in a new way. The hermeneutical relation concerns our reality, for the 
text interprets us.”5
The hermeneutic compulsion of which Schürmann writes here drew us to 
the auditorium that semester; and, aside perhaps from the Phaedo itself, it would 
be difficult to imagine a more poignant text to interpret us that spring than Being 
and Time. Indeed, the reading Schürmann offered was animated by a situated at-
tunement to the existential conditions under which human life inhabits the world 
and by what a resolute and authentic openness to them might yet make possible. 
It was, in short, animated by an attuned understanding of the Heideggerian text 
in the Heideggerian sense. As equi-original structures of human being-in-the-
world, attunement and understanding condition all hermeneutical encounter; but 
it was made explicit in Schürmann’s lectures early that spring, lectures that were, 
like the text on which they focused, destined to remain incomplete.6
We might indeed begin here at the end, reversing Schürmann’s own ten-
dency to tarry with the question of beginning; for although he himself began 
that semester with a bold and nuanced reading of the introduction of Being and 
Time in order to orient us properly to the way that enigmatic text provokes us to 
take up the question of Being as a task, attending here at the beginning to where 
Schürmann’s reading broke off will allow us to find our way back to a central 
teaching of philosophy and enable us to discern again something of the power 
of Schürmann’s teaching.
The Heuristics of Dysfunction
By April 14, 1993, Schürmann had led us to the very place where Being and Time 
comes into contact with its own limits even as it articulates the deepest ontologi-
cal structure of Dasein. Throughout the semester, Schürmann had been circling 
around the temporality of Dasein, following the spiraling path along which the 
ontological analytic of Dasein unfolds in Being and Time. That path moves from 
the surface to the depth, mimicking the method of Aristotle in the first book of 
the Physics, as it progressively uncovers the ontological structure of Dasein first 
in terms of our being-in-the-world, then according to care (Sorge), the existential 
manner in which we are always already attuned to the world we inhabit, and now, 
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finally in §§48–50, in terms of time.7 In these sections, the ontological analytic 
of Dasein attains its deepest existential articulation as it reveals the temporal 
structure of Dasein itself. They mark too, however, the limits of Being and Time; 
for our encounter with the temporal structure of Dasein points to a longer path 
of thinking and action that would need to be undertaken in order to properly 
understand Being as time. Heidegger had, of course, pointed us in this direction 
in the introduction, and Schürmann had been careful to chart this course for 
us at the beginning of the semester.8 We were, here in his final session, being 
asked to return to the beginning, precisely as Schürmann’s own thinking again 
and again required of itself. And yet, that day, without fully realizing it, we were 
being asked to return to the beginning again without him, and invited to pursue 
the question of being, as he had, by undertaking the practice of philosophy as a 
kind of devoted care of death.
The session began, in an irony that was palpable for us at the time, at the 
moment where the analytic of Dasein requires us to consider the existential struc-
ture of being-toward-death. Schürmann had prepared us well for the moment 
because he had, earlier in the semester, developed an account of the “heuristics 
of dysfunction” in relation to the famous analysis in Being and Time of the ham-
mer which reveals its being precisely when it fails to be capable of performing its 
function.9 Schürmann had, in that context, emphasized how what is ready-to-hand 
(zuhanden) presents itself in a new way when it fails to operate in the manner in 
which we’d come to expect. In breaking down, the hammer becomes objectively 
present (vorhanden) to us as we come to encounter a dimension of its being that 
had remained opaque so long as it continued to do what we expected of it. The 
heuristics of dysfunction does not reveal a new being to us, but rather, it uncov-
ers a deeper dimension of the being with which we had long thought ourselves 
familiar.10 As Schürmann put it, “dysfunction reveals a function.”11
So too, now, in §§48–50, we were asked to consider the heuristics of dysfunc-
tion in relation to the being of Dasein itself, a task that asks more of us than we are 
capable of accomplishing. However, in attending to Schürmann as he pursued this 
reading of the text and attempted to perform it properly in life, we came perhaps 
closer to an attuned understanding of being-toward-death in its concreteness 
than any of us expected.
The three dimensions of being-toward-death with which Schürmann began 
that session, following the text, discloses death as 1) my ownmost possibility, 2) 
non-relational, and 3) not to be outstripped.12 The reading Schürmann offered 
that day performed in a remarkable way precisely what the text itself requires 
of each of us: to orient ourselves toward our own death in a way that refuses to 
allow death to remain abstract and distant. If these three dimensions of being-
toward-death are designed to singularize us by bringing us face to face with our 
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own finitude so as to uncover the temporal structure of human existence itself, 
that day Schürmann put the teaching of the text into practice.
As my ownmost possibility, death is a potentiality that is always mine. Here 
the notion of authenticity is concretized, for what is eigentlich in Heidegger, is 
what is my own (eigen). The existential structure of being-toward-death throws 
me back upon myself. A proper orientation toward death can never be determined 
according to a “they.” “They” do not die, I do. Thus, this first dimension of being-
toward-death requires each of us to recognize death as always my own. Death is 
always my possibility.
As a possibility, being-toward-death uncovers the fore-structure of Dasein. 
Death always already conditions my being-in-the-world whether I attend to it 
or not. Yet, in attending to the existential structure of being-toward-death, I am 
also singularized, wrenched from the network of relationships with which I am 
also always involved. Schürmann put it this way: “Death is the initial breach from 
the everyday realm of common sense.”13 It directs us not to the world we inhabit, 
but it pulls me back toward myself. Here, the non-relational dimension of being-
toward-death begins to make itself felt: death is not something someone else can 
undertake for me, nor can it be experienced in the way we all lived through the 
death of our teacher. Death singularizes.
That death is, third, not to be outstripped indicates the degree to which we 
have come to encounter a limit in relation to which there is nothing more en-
compassing. Death is an ultimate that can neither be circumvented nor denied; 
death can only be anticipated. Being-towards-death reveals the futurity of Dasein’s 
ek-sistance. Schürmann designated the being of Dasein as “ek-sistence” in order 
to emphasize the way Dasein, in its being, is always ahead of itself. The hyphen 
was designed to gesture to the transcendence of Dasein, the manner in which it 
stands out of itself in anticipation of its death-to-come.14
Yet, encountering death as being-toward-death opens me also to a way of 
living together with others that makes dying my care; it opens us to a practice 
of philosophy in the Socratic spirit, one that refuses to remain on the surface of 
things, but rather, devotes itself to deepening our understanding of ourselves and 
the world we inhabit even as we stand out towards our ownmost potentiality for 
being, non-relational, and not to be outstripped.
Heidegger called this way of being, authenticity (Eigentlichkeit), a manner of 
being proper to Dasein, and put into practice by singular figures willing to stand 
outside of themselves toward their own death in ways that empower them to enrich 
the lives of those they encounter here. Schürmann captured the signature of the 
heuristic dysfunction of death when he said “it ‘owns up’ to the whole of existence 
from birth to death.”15 In this, death holds life accountable to itself, pulling each 
of us toward a limit that requires us to return to one another more deeply attuned 
to the temporality that conditions our being-in-the-world.
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Here, however, we come up against the limits of Being and Time in two con-
nected ways. Internally to the project of the text, as Dasein reveals its temporal 
structure, we are called back to the deeper question of Being with which the book 
begins. The question of Being, which had been retrieved at the inception of the 
book, had been pursued through an investigation into the being of Dasein. Dasein, 
in disclosing its temporality, points to a longer road that will require us to think 
Being itself in terms of time. Schürmann had gestured to this longer road at the 
beginning of his lectures when he argued for a holistic reading of Heidegger’s 
work in which the trajectory of the question of Being, the question that occupied 
Heidegger from beginning to end, sets us on an itinerary that begins with Being 
and Time, continues through the so-called “turn,” and leads ultimately to the last 
published lectures of Heidegger’s life entitled On Time and Being which itself 
continues the attempt to think Being as time.16
By calling attention to the course of Heidegger’s life and the question that 
animated it, we come up against another limit of Being and Time, namely, the 
degree to which it remains still too focused on the structures of the self and, 
more specifically, on an understanding of authenticity that fails to return us to the 
world we inhabit with others. The pursuit of the question of the being of Dasein 
leads us in a progressively deepening movement to an encounter with our own 
death that can, although it need not, impoverish our relationships with those we 
encounter in the world.
This limitation of Being and Time was redressed to some degree in the per-
formance of the reading Schürmann offered us in the spring of 1993. To discern 
this, it will be necessary to attend to the final point over which Schürmann tar-
ried during that final session. It was the question of Being-with, and specifically, 
Being-with as it attends to the presencing of beings.
The Presencing of Beings
Having disclosed the futurity of Dasein through an analysis of being-towards-
death, Schürmann turned our attention to the equi-original structures of the 
temporality of Dasein: projection, thrownness, and Being-with. In projection, 
as we have heard, Dasein authentically “lets itself come towards itself,” as Schür-
mann put it that day.17 In this, we connect “Eigentlichkeit”—what is properly 
one’s own—to “Erschlossenheit”—openness—in a way that draws our attention 
to the manner in which we might comport ourselves authentically to the beings 
we encounter. Schürmann thus gestures toward a way of responding to what 
presents itself rooted ontologically in the very temporality of Dasein, a response 
that refuses to allow itself to become absorbed in an inauthentic obsession with 
death as one’s ownmost potentiality. Although the non-relational character of 
authentic being-towards-death requires us to recognize death as singularizing, 
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when this futurity of Dasein is reintegrated into a more holistic understanding 
of ek-sistential temporality, it reveals itself as a kind of openness that might be 
the basis of more authentic relationships with others.
This suggestion was amplified in that last lecture by Schürmann’s account 
of thrownness, the second of the three ek-stasies of time which Schürmann the-
matizes as the “sense of Care.” Here, “sense” points to the complex intertwining 
of past, present, and future. Schürmann reminds us that “the originary unity of 
the structure of care lies in temporality.” Indeed, he is careful here to insist on the 
equi-originality of past, present, and future even if the pull of death endemic to the 
ek-static future has a heuristic priority in revealing the temporality of Dasein.18 
Yet, for Schürmann, the sense of sense (Sinn) is that it points to the dynamic pos-
sibilities of being. Thus, the directionality of the term “Sinn,” which almost cannot 
be articulated without a demonstrative gesture, is proper to a being whose being 
is temporal. To speak of temporality as the “sense of Care” is to point to the pos-
sibilities endemic to the play of all three ek-stasies of the temporality of Dasein.
Thus, thrownness, which had characterized the facticity of Dasein’s being-
in-the-world, is here heard to gesture to a certain having-being as always already 
my own. The historicity of Dasein here comes to expression; authentic Dasein 
must recognize itself as having-been. The past is not, of course, over and done, but 
always at work in the existential structure of the being of Dasein itself. If being-
towards-death orients me to my ownmost possibility to come, thrownness requires 
me to recognize that what has been too is a persisting and living dimension of 
my ongoing ek-sistance. Indeed, even now in writing and reflecting on the living 
presence of Reiner Schürmann and on the legacy of his teaching on my life as it 
continues to unfold, this dimension of my own having-been is made palpable.
Ek-static temporality makes itself felt in this sense of care for what has 
come before, for my ownmost possibility, and now, finally, for my openness to 
what comes to presence. This was, indeed, where the lecture ended, with a kind 
of injunction to let beings presence. Schürmann thematized this, following Hei-
degger, as Being-alongside-with, Sein-bei.19 This is the authentic sense of care 
that marks the temporality of the present, and it requires of each of us a capacity 
to allow things to come to presence as they are, and to tarry with them in their 
very presencing.
It would be difficult to imagine a more proper place for that final lecture to 
come to an end. Schürmann was concerned with precisely how to be present in 
authentic ways and specifically with modes of disclosedness that let beings be.
Moments of Encounter
These were the very concerns that had animated his own desire to arrange a 
meeting with Martin Heidegger twenty-seven years earlier. In 1966, a 24-year-
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old Schürmann studying in Freiburg wrote to Heidegger to request an in-person 
meeting to address two questions. The first concerned Meister Eckhart’s attempt to 
“think being as self-sending.” Attuned to the manner in which being shows itself, 
Schürmann wondered if being was “only eventfully experienceable.” The second 
too concerned the site of the encounter with being, and specifically whether “the 
mystery of the gift could be experienced as the mystery of the ‘thou,’ without 
thinking’s having to fall into representation.”20
These two questions suggest the degree to which Schürmann’s thinking 
remained deeply concerned with how we might properly respond to the coming 
to presence of being. It is also not without significance that Schürmann sought a 
face to face dialogue with Heidegger on these two questions, questions that invite 
us to consider more fully how to be-alongside-with what comes to presence. He 
sought, in short, an opportunity to be-alongside Heidegger as he responded to such 
essential questions, just as we, twenty-seven years later, sought to be-alongside 
Schürmann as he responded to the questions Being and Time asks of us.
Schürmann’s own account of the encounter, written in a letter to an unknown 
correspondent on the very day it happened, March 11, 1966, captures something 
significant about what it means to devote one’s life to the practice of philosophy 
as care of death.
Reading the letter now, it is difficult not to transfer all the eager excitement, 
trepidation, and respect Schürmann ascribes to his encounter with Heidegger to 
our encounters with Schürmann as a teacher. He begins by announcing that “the 
event that I awaited eagerly and with stage-fright has just taken place.”21 Anyone 
who has given a presentation in a Schürmann course or written a paper for him 
understands the stage-fright of which Schürmann himself speaks here. Schür-
mann could be a daunting figure. We would often share stories with one another 
about how, for example, he would pull his glasses down to the end of his nose, 
and, looking over them, admonish a student: “this is a perfect example of how 
not to give a presentation;” or how he had once written in the margins of a paper 
a student had written completely in aphorisms: “this is not philosophy.” Leverag-
ing shame and fear in this way is not a pedagogical practice to be emulated, but 
it had profound motivating effects. We worked hard to live up to the standards 
he required of himself and of us; he was a model of the kind of scholarship we 
each wanted to practice.
However daunting he may have at times been, he also embodied himself 
what he said of Heidegger: “the man is so shrewd, and, above all, he has such 
a listening ability (in this respect, I have never met anyone as heedful of what 
one says) that it felt like my meager schoolboy questions were received by warm 
and reassuring hands.”22 Schürmann too had such reassuring hands, and he was 
generous in using them to lead us along paths of thinking and acting we did not 
at first discern, and then, once discerned, did not think were possible to traverse.
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Once when he came across me, deflated after receiving a lower grade than I 
had hoped on a mid-term paper I had written for him on Plotinus, he sat down 
next to me and asked what was bothering me. He was tired then, battling AIDS, 
and yet, still generous with his time, attuned to his students, and tender in his 
response. Two things I carry with me from that conversation: first, reconstruc-
tive readings are the condition for the possibility of excellence in philosophy, but 
they are not sufficient—you must be creative; and second, he was confident in 
my capacity to put that creativity into practice in a philosophical life. I return to 
that conversation frequently—and to the manner in which he was there with 
me in the moment—as to a wellspring that has served as a touchstone. This was 
being-with in its deepest ontological sense, laden by what has-been, pulled by 
what would come, and yet there, listening and responding with reassuring hands.
I wonder if that March 1966 conversation with Heidegger in Frieburg as the 
darkness of evening descended might have been for Schürmann and his life what 
his encounter with me that day was for me and mine: a moment that set one on a 
course, an encounter that helped to animate a life, giving it direction and purpose 
by affirming what was always somehow already there. The question that came to 
occupy Heidegger and Schürmann that day was not the mystical question Eckhart 
invites us to experience, but the question concerning whether “the saying of ‘thou’ 
is part and parcel of the being of Dasein.”23 Schürmann found it difficult to convey 
in writing the living experience of the thou. As Buber recognized, “the real and 
filled present exists only in so far as actual presentness [Gegenwärtigkeit], meeting, 
and relation exist. Only there, where the Thou becomes present, does the present 
exist.”24 Schürmann’s inability to convey in writing the depth of his encounter 
with Heidegger is itself eloquent testimony to the way genuine encounters dis-
solve upon reflection. And yet, even so, Schürmann captures something of its 
signature when he relates that “the outcome of this part of the conversation, the 
longest and most interesting (and of which he himself said that in it we touched 
on something profound), was quite remarkable.”25 When the “thou” becomes 
present between teacher and student and the two attend resolutely to what comes 
to presence between them, it can shape the course of a life.
Heidegger insisted during his encounter with Schürmann that day that the 
experience of the “thou” goes beyond the “es” of “es gibt Sein,” “there is being.”26 
Schürmann conveys it this way:
The experience is no longer one of thought alone, but of all of oneself (those 
are still his own words). In this sense, philosophy does not speak about that 
experience. It does, however, open the paths on which such an experience 
might become real.27
Schürmann taught us that an experience with the “thou” does not only unfold 
between human beings, but it can also arise between us and the texts we encounter. 
In a deep philosophical sense, we had all come to Schürmann to learn how to read 
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in ways that empower texts to interpret us, to shape our lives. This, of course, is 
also what he was modeling for us during that final course on Being and Time in 
the spring of 1993. In his essay, Symbolic Difference, Schürmann writes:
The interpreted word wishes to develop possibilities of being which were latent 
in me. It creates reality. . . . The word ‘reality’ thus designates much more than 
the totality of the objects which come into our hand, res. If it is understood 
from interpretative existence, the concept of reality becomes temporalized: 
the future as that which is possible, not yet in hand, determines us as much as 
‘facts,’ present or past. The fact is mute, but reality tells me something about 
myself: it is a category of language. That which speaks to me is real. Language 
alone frees reality.28
Schürmann spoke to us that semester, and in so speaking, allowed the text to speak 
to us as well, to free a reality for each of us, to set us upon a path. Schürmann 
concludes his account of his encounter with Heidegger on the question of the 
“thou” as endemic to the being of Dasein with these words: “philosophy’s role is 
to open the way by which an unutterable experience may be given, but such an 
experience would no longer be answerable to philosophy; it would be the preroga-
tive of the one to whom it was granted.”29
And yet, this is an impoverished vision of philosophy, one that presumes what 
Schürmann himself never would: that the activities of thinking can be segregated 
from the practices of living. Schürmann taught us that such a segregation was not 
possible, that thinking and acting are intimately intertwined, and that they come 
to life in language and through the ways we respond to what comes to presence.
In this, we are returned to the final passages on which Schürmann focused 
during his final lecture. He had called our attention to section 65 of Being and 
Time, “Temporality as the Ontological Sense of Care,” and specifically, in the end, 
to the question of presencing. Here we find this passage:
Only as the present (Gegenwart) in the sense of presencing (Gegenwärtigens) 
can resoluteness be what it is: the undisguised letting what it apprehends in 
action be encountered.30
The final passage on which that final session ended was itself a call to let what 
comes to presence in action be. In calling our attention to this text and allowing it 
to continue even now to speak to us, Schürmann eloquently encourages us—and 
perhaps in so doing took heart himself—to be resolute in the wake of what we 
were encountering there in action, the dying of a beloved teacher.
In this, Schürmann was genuinely Socratic; for Phaedo articulates how 
Socrates, in anticipating his own death, heartened those friends who had gath-
ered in his cell on that final, fateful day by responding gracefully to the unsettling 
crisis to which their argument had come. The arguments that had begun with 
Simmias laughing had, by the middle of the dialogue, come to a point of crisis as 
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those gathered began to realize that perhaps like the body, the soul “altogether 
perishes.”31 Here, however, Phaedo breaks off his re-enactment of what was said 
in Socrates’ cell that day to reflect upon his experience by speaking in the first 
person directly to Echecrates about the impact Socrates had on those present. 
Phaedo says that he had often wondered at Socrates, but never more than at that 
moment, as Socrates responded to his unsettled and disheartened friends.
What I especially wondered at him for was first this: how pleasantly and kindly 
and admiringly he received the argument (logon) of the young men, but then 
also how acutely he perceived what we had suffered from the words, and then 
how well he healed us and, as if he called back those fleeing and defeated, he 
urged us to follow close along with him and examine the account (logon).32
Schürmann, like Socrates, always urged us to follow close along with him in 
examining the logos. So too, in that last lecture, he healed us well by directing 
us back to the text where we encounter the question of being and how we might 
cultivate practices of authentic care and devote our lives to the practice of phi-
losophy as care of death.
If, as Heidegger suggests, “Care is being-toward-death,” then it also involves 
being attuned to the moment in an intentional way.33 In Being and Time, Heidegger 
calls this Entschlossenheit, resoluteness. Thus, his text tells us: “Resolute, Dasein 
has brought itself back out of entanglement [aus dem Verfallen] in order all the 
more authentically to be ‘there’ in the moment [Augenblick] for the disclosed 
situation.”34 To be resolutely there in the moment requires habits of thinking and 
acting that enable us to tarry authentically with what discloses itself between us.
If, as Schürmann suggests, “Symbols effect the translation of discourse into 
a course, a path,” then those of us who had come to Schürmann to learn how to 
read were invited to attend carefully to what comes to presence in the texts we 
interpret and to chart a course of life, resolute and authentic, attuned always to 
what comes to presence in the moment of encounter. This, ultimately, was the 
lesson Schürmann had to teach that day, and it is one that continues to animate 
the lives of those who encountered him.
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